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Involuntary Terminations under Explicit
and Implicit Employment Contracts
ABSTRACT
This study investigates where and when last—in—first—out permanent
layoff policies seem to go hand in hand with compensation policies under
which the net value of senior workers appears to be less than that of their
junior peers. The investigation relies upon both the approximately 260 usable
responses to a survey we mailed out to a sample of U.S. firms and microdata
from the computerized personnel files of a major U.S. corporation. Ourfindings
for U.S. companies outside of agriculture and construction lead us to the
following three conclusions: (1) For most employees, it appears that protection
against job loss grows with seniority, although net value to the firm does not.
(2) While a very sizeable percentage of nonunion workersmay be covered by
implicit employment contracts which give more protection against termination to
those with more seniority, a much higher percentage of workers coveredby
collectivebargaining agreements seem to enjoy such protection; and (3) The
job protection afforded senior nonunion personnel, especially exempt employees,












(617)253—2661At most U.S. work places, junior employees appear to be paid less
than the value of their current contribution, while senior employees
appear to be paidmore.1 This phenomenon is consistent with the presence
of either explicit or implicit employment ctitract provisions designed to defer
earnings from early to later in the worklife.2 Contract provisions
under which compensation is deferred to late in the working years have
been hypothesized to be attractive to the parties involved because, for
one or more of a variety of possiblereasons,, workers can be offered any
given level of expected utility at a lower expected cost to the employer
than if wage equalled value marginal product at each point in time.3
An earnings provision of this sort could produce a positively—
sloped seniority—earnings profile even if productivity was constant or
decreased with tenure. Under the provision, employees with greater—than—
average company service are paid more than the value of their contribution
in return for having accepted earnings less than their contribution at the
start of their tenure.
Onewouldexpect that an explicit or implicit contract with a pay
provision like the one just discussed would also have a provision designed
to protect workers from being cheated out of the return promised for the
second half of their work1ves, At least in the U.S., the most common type
of provision providing this protection found in explicit (union) contracts
is one which calls for layoffs in inverse seniority order.4 But what goes
on in nonunion settings? How prevalent are implicit last—in—first—out
termination policies? Are they as binding in all states of nature (that is,
as "strong") as those which are found under unionism?
In this paper, we assess the likely prevalence of implicit contract provisions
under which senior employees are protected against being laid of before junior
employees by studying whether, in the absence of a union contract, junior employees—2—
are sometimes terminated while senior employees keep their jobs, in spite
of the perceived net value of the senior employees being less than that of
their terminated junior compatriots.5 We also assess the likely "strength" of puta-
tive implicit contract provisions pertaining to the order of layoffs
by looking at outcomes in various states of nture.0
In the first section, we summarize the large amount of evidence which
supports the proposition that junior employees in a wide variety of occupations
are typically paid less than their current value marginal product while their
senior co—workers are typically paid more. These studies strongly suggest that
schemes under which pay is deferred from early to later in the worklife are
the rule, not the exception, throughout the U.S. economy.
In Section II, we lay out a sflp1e framework for discussing the role
an implicit contract provision pertaining to terminations can play in bring-
ing the ex post interests of the employer and his/her employees closer to-
gether. We then present evidence to support the argument that, in the absence
of any implicit contract provision governing terminations but given existing
wage and productivity profiles, employers would typically want to terminate
senior employees before junior employees. Thus, a last-in-first—out rule
could potentially play a key role in conditioning employees' permanent layoff
decisions. Finally, we discuss why a last—in—first—out layoff rule might
be the preferred approach to protecting employees' deferred earnings.
Section III offers an empirical assessment of where and when last—in—
first—out termination policies do in fact protect potentially vulnerable senior—3--
employees from losing their jobs when workforce cutbacksoccur. This
assessment relies upon both the approximately 260 usableresponses to
a survey we mailed out to a sanple of U.S. firms andmicrodata from the
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computerized personnel files of a major U.S.corporation. Ourfindings
for U.S. companies outside of agriculture andconstruction lead us to
the following three conclusions: (1) Formost employee it appears
that protection against job loss grows with seniority,although net value
to the firm does not. (2) While a very sizeable percentage of nonunion
workers may be covered by implicit employment contracts whichgive more pro—
taction against termination to those with more seniority, a muchhigher percent-
age of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements seem to en-oysuch protec—
tion; and (3) The job protection afforded senior nonunion personnel, especially exemrt
employees, appears to be less strong than that provided tounion members
In Section IV, we summarize the main conclusions of our analysis and
offer some suggestions for future research.
I. Evidence on the Relationship of Tenure toWages and Productivity
Examination of available data reveals that,controlling for occupation
and industry, length of company service tendsto be positively related to
wages. Previous studies have provided a large body of evidence which
strongly suggests that, again controlling for occupation andindustry,
productivity bears either no relationship or a negativerelationship to
length of service after a short initiation period. Whenjuxtaposed, these
two sets of findings seem to imply that senior (junior)workers are indeed
typically paid more (less) than their value marginal product.
Onesourceof data on the relationship of tenure to rate ofpay—4—
is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) conducted by researchers at the
University of Michigan. We estimated separate ln(hourly wage) equations for blue
collar workers and for managers and professionals using 1971 PSID data
and 1974 PSID data (a total of four separate samples). Our results
are presented in Appendix A. Controlling for 1—digit industry and 1—digit
occupation, those with less than 3 years of tenure earned between 13 and
20 percent less than those with 3 to 10 years tenure (coefficient
statistically significant in all four sanp1es) and those with more than
20 years of tenure earned between 10 and 12 percent more than those with
3 to 10 years of tenure (coeificient statistically significant in three
of four samples)
8
While tenure appears to be positively related to earnings both among
blue collar workers and among managers and professionals, there is a great
deal of evidence which strongly suggests that in most occupations additional
service is not positively related to productivity. We have completed an
exhaustive search of the extant literature on the relationship between
an individual's tenure (or experience or age) and his/her productivity; all
26 studies which we were able to locate are summarized in Appendix B. 9,10
The large body of available evidence provides support for the following stylized
facts: (1) Among managers and professionals, employees who have greater—than—
average service typically perform less well than employees with similar assign-
ments who have less-than—average service (but are beyond the typically -
shortorientation period); and (2) Among hourly employees (beyond a normally even
shorter orientation period), seniority is usually unrelated to productivity among
those performing comparable work. When considered together with the evidence from the
PSID that wages have a strong positive relationship with tenure, what we know about
the relationship of productivity to tenure makes it seem likely that more (less)
senior employees are generally paid more. (less) than their value marginal product.—5—
This conclusion might be criticized on the grounds that the wage results
and the productivity results we have compared do not really mesh insofar as
the two sets of findings were derived using different samples and arguably incompatible
methodologies. among the productivity studies we reviewed, those completed by
the authors and by their students (Nedoff 1977, Medoff and Abraham l980a and
forthcoming, Halasz 1980, and Yanker 1980) were designed specifically to test
whether the higher earnings of more senior employees could bejustified on
the basis that the senior employees were better performers thanjunior employees
doing comparable work.
At each of the four companies whose personnel data were analyzed in
our earlier papers (one airline and three manufacturing firms) approx-
imately 40 percent of the return to company service among white male exempt11
employees occurred within job grade levels. The central issue addressed in
these studies was whether this consistently substantial within—grade—level
return to seniority could be explained on the basis of more senior employees
being relatively more productive than less senior employees in the same grade
level.
To answer this question, we constructed measures of relative within—grade—
level productivity based on performance evaluations for each white male exempt
employee at each of our four firms. Our underlying assumption was that white males in a
grade level who received higher performance ratings were relatively more productive than
comparable employees in the same grade level who received lower performance
ratings. This assumption seemed reasonable since, at each of the companies we
studied, jobs were grouped into grade levels on the basis of their importance
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and difficulty. In each case, we found that while additional company service
was associated with being higher in the relevant within—grade—level salary
distribution, it was associated withbeinglower in the relevant within—grade--
level performance distribution.—6—
Halasz (1980) applied the same methodology to data for a sample of nonunion
production and warehouse employees. For this group, approximately half of
the return to company service occurred within grade levels. While addiitonal
company service beyond the mean amount was associated with a higher probability
of being towards the top of one's within—grade—level salary distribution, it
was associated with a lower probability of being towards the top of one's
within—grade—level performance distribution. In Yanker's (1980) sample of
blue collar union employees, approximately 80 percent of the total return to
seniority occurred within departments; none of this within—deDartnent
return could be explained by reference to measured productivity. Our earlier
studies, the Halasz study and the Yanker study all indicate that senior
employees tend to be overpaid relative to junior employees performing work
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of comparable difficulty and importance.
The aforementioned studies focus on within—assignment earnings differ-
entials. Medoff and Abraham (l980b) summarizes data collected with the
survey instrument discussed at length below14 which strongly suggests
that approximately 50 percent of our country's private sector nonagricultural
nonconstruction employees work in settings where senior employees are favored
substantially when promotion decisions are made.1 Hence, for this half of
the U.S. workforce, it appears that the piece of the total monetary return
to seniority which can be linked to senior employees having been promoted to
better—paying jobs than are held by otherwise comparable junior employees is to
a signficant extent a reward to seniority se, rather than simply a reward
for higher productivity. Moreover, it should be noted that the 50 percent
figure estimates the percentage of the workforce employed where senior
employees seem to be favored substantially in promotion decisions; the
percentage working where senior employees are favored at all is likely to be
much greater. This is because in many settings senior employees can beexpected to have a significantly higher probability of being promoted
than their junior colleagues when the comparisons are limited to those
with the same productivity.16
In sum, even when seniority independent of productivity is not
rewarded in promotion decisions, the evidence pertaining to within-grade
or within—job earnings differentials strongly suggests that, overall,
seniority p se is handsomely rewarded in most firms' compensation policies;
for the 50 percent or more of the labor force for which seniority in and of
itself seems to enhance promotion possibilities, this conclusion holds
afortiori. That is, it appears that the vast majority of the U.S. workforce
is employed where a significant fraction of earnings are deferred from early
to later in the worklife. Thus, it would seem that employees would seek
policies that would protect the interests of those whohav'ébeen "underpaid"
for some period and anticipate being "overpaid".
II.Why We Night E ect to Find Last—In—First—Out Termination Provisions
We begin this section byoffering a simple framework for discussing
howan employer who faced given wageprofiles arid productivity profiles
mightmake termination decisions and how animplicitcontract provision
pertainingto terminations might affect those decisions. Next, we argue
that available empirical evidence implies that in the absence of any
implicit contract provision pertaining to terminations, but given the
actual compensation and contribution structures, U.S. employers would
typically be more likely to terminate senior employees than junior employees.
Thus, last—in—first—out implicit contract provisions could potentially play
animportant role in conditioning firms' termination decisions, Finally,
we discuss why inverse—seniority—order termination policies might be the
method chosen for protecting employees' returns under the deferred compensation
schemeswhich we believe are common intheU.S. economy (as discussed in
Section I).—8—
TheSimple Framework
Let us define the "net value" of employee j to a firm about to
terminate some workers (s.) as follows:
it0
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where v is the value marginal product of workerj in period t; w. is the
wage of j in t; T denotes the end of the firm's planning horizon;
e. is the probability that j would not have left the firm voluntarily in or
prior to t; r is the appropriate discount rate;c. represents the expected
resentvalue as of period tof the cost to the firm of replacing j if he/she
weretoleave in t; andp. represents the probability that j will quitor
voluntarilyretire from the firm in t.
The first three terms in the expression for capture the expected
present value of any gap(s) between what j contributes to the firm and whatj
is being paid in the current and in any relevant futureperiod. The terms involving
c.'s reflect the fact that terminating those workers doing each affectedjob
who would have been most likely to quit or retireanyway will reduce the
firm's expected hiring and training costs below what they would have otherwise
been.
A profit—maximizing firm which had to let some employeesgo would wish to
terminate employee 1 before employee 2 in periodto if with
(2) 1 'jt ='t+ =t a. 0 0jt(l+r)tto—9—
where a. represents the expected value of the Costs (not reflectedin s)
to the firm in period t if it terminates j into, such as Costs associated
with current and prospective employees' reactionsto j's termination or
those associated with the severancepay received by j, and T again denotes
the end of the firm's planning horizon.
In determining the order of permanent layoffs, thefirm would
consider both the net value of each employee and thecosts associated
with his/her termination. Therein lies thepotential for an implicit contract
provision which affects the a.'s. For example, a fiDm thatwas operating
under a last—in—first—out implicit contractprovision might incur costs stem-
ming from reluctance of new employees to join the firm, bruised workforcemorale,
and/or increased employee interest in unionization if itterminated senior employees
before junior employees.
Assessing the existence and strength of implicit employment contracts
pertaining to order of involuntary terminations requires that we determine
the relationship between thes.of equation (1) and employee seniority. If
the5jt is larger for senior workers, then an implicit contract provision
under which the costs of terminating rises withyears of service would have
a definite role; it would give senior employees job securitythey would
not otherwise enjoy, given the existing wage and productivity profiles. If
the did not decline with seniority, it would be impossible to test for
the existence of a last—in—first—out implicit contractprovision; in this case,
we would not expect an employer to terminate senior workers first even
in the absence of an implicit contract provision proscribing such conduct.
Potential Vulnerability to Job Loss During a Crisis
Invery bad states of nature, we can expect that the firm's discount
rate will be very high(r-*-o) or,to put it differently, that the firm's planning
horizon will be very short (T+t) and that the firm willnot be replacing employees—10—
who voluntarily depart. In this scenario, an employer would want to be rid
of employee 1 before employee 2 if:
(3) vlt —w1+ ai< v2 —w2+ a2.
Thus, in very bad states of nature, only the current wage, current productivity,
and current termination costs are likely to determine which employees a firm
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terminates.
There are at least two good reasons to believe that the approximation
r --(T÷t)is not unreasonable insofar as decisionmaking related to
permanent layoffs is concerned. First, firms that find themselves cutting
back their employment through permanent layoffs most typically are encoun—
tering very difficult economic conditions. For such firms, doing well enough
in the current period to survive into the next period is apt to be a very
real consideration. Second, for the person actually charged with deciding
which employees should be terminated, taking steps which increase profits
in the current period is apt to seem particularly important. An exécütive who
fails to produce immediate results may find his/her job on the line)8
We believe we showed in Section I that the gap between current wages
and current productivity is typically greater for senior employees than for
junior employees in most occupation. Thus, v —w
in
above is apt to be smaller for senior than for junior employees. Since
the approximation r-- (T ÷t)is likely to be quite reasonable when permanent
layoffs are occuring, employment contract provisions affecting the a's in
(3) in such a way that the current costs of terminating senior employees exceed
the current costs of terminating junior employees could play an important
role in conditioning firms'ex post termination decisions.—11—
More Evidence Concerning Potential Vulnerability to Job—Loss
A good argument can be made for believing that those employees valued least by the
firmand,hence, potentially most vulnerable to job loss in the absence of any contract
provision governing terminations are the same employees whose voluntary departures would
be least regretted by the firm. We can write the firni's net loss from jquittingin
t(d.) as:
(4 d.=s. + a ___ ' / ,jtjt =tJ ° ° ° (i+r)o
where the a. terms capture the indirect costs related to other current
and prospective future employee's reactions to employee j's quit
which are incurred by the firm in period tifjdepartsin period to. The
a terms are intended to pick up costs associated with such things as
change in workforce morale, or change in ability to recruit desirable employees,
resulting from js "voluntary" separation.
T
, 1
If ' a________ jt
-isthe same for all employees,s will
(l+r) o -o
be greater than 52t(employee 1 will have a higher net value than employee 2)
whenever di is gr:ater than d2t (that is, whenever employee l's quit is




forbelieving that a should be systeioatically related to tt (l+r)o
seniority. On the one hand, quits of long service employees might lower workforce
morale. On the other hand, by opening up promotion possibilities, voluntary :.
separationsof senior employees would most likely enhance employee's perceptions
of how quickly they might get ahead at the firm.
If we accept the seemingly reasonable assumption that 1
a (l+r) —o
is not associated with seniority, evidence that senior workers' quits
-
wereless likely to be regretted than junior workers' quits would indicate that the—12—
perceived net value relevant for ex post termination decisions is less for senior
employees than for their junior compatriots. This would mean that an
implicit contract provision affecting the a.'s of(2)above in such a way
thatthe present value of the costs associated withterminating a senior
employee exceeded the present value of the costs associated withterminating
ajunior employee could play an important role in influencing firms'
cxjtermination decisions.
From 1971to 1976, Company C collected data which allowedus to
aDproximaterelative d 's for all exempt employees ina civen rade. Duriric! Jt
-
thisperiod, supervisors at Company C were asked to label the quits of their
exempt subordinates as "regretted," "nonregretted," or "encouraged." In the
1973 to 1975 period (the years to be analyzed below),among white male exempt
employees (the group to be studied), 68 percent of all quits wereregretted,
18 percent were nonregretted, and 15 percent wereencouraged. It seems
reasonable to assume that employees whose departure was"regretted" had d.'s
larger than the d.'s of employees whose departurewas "nonregretted" or
tencouraged" 19
While it is possible to estimate the effects of variousemtloyee
characteristics on the extent to which qitters' departuresire regretted,
these estimated effects could well represent biased estimates ofthe
relationships between the characteristics and degree of regret over iuit
for the company's workforce as a whole. Given theway the U.S. labor
market for managerial and professionalemployees saci- to operate, we were concerned
that. the partial correlation between valueto the firm andcompanyservice would
be more positive (or equivalently lessnegative) for Company C's quitters-13-
than for Company C's entire exempt population. If this were thecase,
simple estimates of the relationship between supervisors' degree ofregret
over quits and years of company service, using data for a sample of auitters,
would understate the extent to which the departure of the typical employee
with more—than—average service would be less regretted than the departure
of the typical employee with below—average service.
The potential importance of sample selection bias of the tyne we are
considering was raised in the influential piece by Heckman (1976). A maximum
likelihood procedure to deal with sample selection bias (also providing
consistent standard errors;, which Heckman's Mills' ratio nrocedure does
not) was developed and cliscissed by Criliches, Hall and Hausman(1978), We
modified this maximum likelihood procedure to deal with sample seletirri
biaswhen the dependent variable in the equationof concern is dichotomous
("quitregretted" versus "quit not regretted") rather than continuous
andcomputed joint maximum likelihood estimates of:(1) 3, the vector of
coefficients in a probit equation with quit/not quit as the dependent variable;
and (2) ,thevector of coefficients in a probit equation with quit regretted!
not regetted the dependent yrJ,b1e, Th.e ec's in the quit equation and jn
the regret equation were assumed to be distributed bivariate normal,
B(c1, a2, p), where c51 is the standard deviation of the error in the quit
equation, ci is the standard deviation of the error in the regret equation
and p is the correlation between the errors in the two equations.




the likelihood for an observation on a person who quit andwas regretted
can be written as:
_____________________ (5) 1 r r___rY2 -I — expL— ) i
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and the likelihood for an observation on a person who quit and wa not
regretted can be written:
xl








where is the vector of independent variables includedin the quit equation
and is the vector of independent variables includedin the regret equation.
Neither a1 nor 0-2 is identified; we set bothequal to i.
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Table 1 presents estimates of the coefficients from a simple
probit regret equation and of the coefficients estimated for the regret
equation using the maximum likelihood technique just described. The simple
probit equation coefficient point estimatessuggest a declining relation-
ship between probability of a quit being regretted and tenure.However, as
discussed above, these estimates are likely to be affectedby sample
selection bias.—15—
The maximum likelihood coefficient estimates morestrongly indicate a
negative relationship between probability of a quit being regretted andtenure.
The maximum likelihood results imply thatpotential quits of those with
more than 20 years tenure are significantly less likely to beregretted
than potential quits of those with less than 10years of tenure. The
coefficient on the 10 to 20 years of tenure dummysuggests that potential
quits of persons in this company service group are lesslikely to be
regretted than potential quits ofpersons with less service; however, the
relevant estimated coefficient is notstatistically significant1
If among all exempt employees perforaing comparablework,
T , 1
jt(1+r)t_to
is unrelated to seniority and supervisor's coding
of quits as "regretted"or otherwise accurately captures the relative size
of thed.'s of equation (4), then these results have the important implication
that the perceived net value relevant for termination decisionsof the most
senior (those with more than 20 years ofcompany service) exempt employees
in any grade level is less than the perceived net valuerelevant for ex post term-
ination decisions of the least senior (thosewith less than 10 years of service)
exempt employees in the same grade. This means that if an implicit contract
provision under which the present value of the costs ofterminating an
employee is positively related to the employee's company service is
operative at Company C, the relationship of seniority to probability of
termination among Company C's exempt employeesmay look quite different
than it would in the absence of such a provision, all else the same.22
WhyLast-In-First-Out Layoff Rules?
Thusfar in this section,wehave argued that, given existing wage
and productivity profiles, a last—in—first—out Implicit contractprovision
which affected the relative losses to the firm associated withterminations—16—
ofjunior versus senior employees could play an important role in condition-
ing firms' termination decisions. We have not yet discussed why a last—in—
first—outrule might be the method actually chosn for protecting employees'
rights to their deferred compensation. However, it must be recognized that this
rule is only one of a set of possible mechanisfor protecting employees'
deferred earnings. For example, one might observe any of the following:
a severance pay scheme under which all terminated employees were given the
present value of the return due to them; a rule under which permanent layoffs
were forbidden; or a policy under which the probability of termination would
be inversely related to the 'present value of the amount o-f 'py deferred.
If we allow for administrative costs, each of these protection
mechanisms has strengths and each has weaknesses. While we cannot ?proveI!
that a last—in—2irst—out rule would be the one chosen from the feasible set,
thisrule seems quite appealing for three princial reasons: (1) A policy
under which terminationsare by inverse seniorityshould discourage employers
fromusing permanent layoffs, since those let go first would have to be
junior employees who on average contribute the most relative to what they are
paid. (2) Since permanent layoffs usually affect only a small percentage
of a firm's work force, terminating employees in inverse seniority order would
generally protect those employees who are owed the greatest amount, namely
those who have just reached the point where their pay equals their current
contribution and who are looking ahead to a period of pay greater than
current contribution. (3) A last—in—first—out rule can be administered,
monitored, and (if necessary) justified at low Cost.
While there is much evidence that employment practices are different
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for unionized workers than for otherwise comparable workers who are not,
it still seems most useful to examine collective bargainingagreements in deriving
priors about the nature of putative implicit contracts. If virtually all explicit ernpl'iy—
ment contracts seemed to have a given provision, we would expect that a large fraction of—17—
implicit employment contracts would have the same provision, unless we had some
particular reason for believing the opposite. This is both because the
relevant production functions and distributions of tastes are not likely to
be completely different in union and nonunion firms and because there
appears to be some spillover of practices from union to nonunion settings,
presumably as a result of the "threat" of unionism.
Under nearly all collective bargaining agreements in the U.S.,
management has the right to determine the number of employees to be terminated.
There are, however, two sets of provisions which are likely to affect
termination decisions. One set deals with the order of terminations and the
other set deals with severance payments to those terminated.
Union contracts typically state that junior workers must be laid off before
senior workers. The most recent relevant study of contract provisions was a BLS
analysis of major contracts (those covering 1,000 or more employees) in effect in 1970—
1971. According to the BLS report, 81 percent of the major contract work force
was covered by some type of layoff provision. Over two—thirds of the 19
percent not covered by any layoff provision were construction workers; of all
the construction workers under major contracts, only 6 percent were covered by
any type of layoff provision. Examination of a sample of those contracts which
contained layoff provisions showed seniority to be the "sole" or "primary"
factor in determining layoff rights for 78 percent of the workers covered by
contracts in the sample, exclusive of those workers covered by contracts in
which the issue was "subject to local negotiationb."24
While last—in—first—out layoff provisions appear to have been found
in the vast majority of union contracts since the advent of industrial unionism,
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severance pay provisions are a relatively new phenomenon. The3e provisions,
under which terminated employees are normally given a Limp—sum reward based
on their years of service and wage at separation, have grown in importance
substantially during the past twenty—five years. Despite this growth,
only 37 percent of the 1978 major contract workforce wascoveredby—18—
26
these plans. Moreover, it should also be noted that a significant
fraction of the employees covered by severance pay provisions are also
covered by a provision stating that layoffs must be by inverse order
27
of seniority.
It appears that in most unionized firms the interests of senior
employees are protected primarily by last—in—first—out layoff policies.
It therefore seems sensible to expect to find such policies in nonunion
settings. However, there are two key reasonswhythese provisions might
be less prevalent and strong in the absence of a union.First, the
weights attached to a given set of preferences are likely to he
significantly different under unionism; in particular, senior
employees can be expected to have much more power relative to their junior
co—workers under unionism.28 Second, the fact that implicit contract pro-
visions pertaining to the order of terminations are not enforceable under U.S.
law (which is not the case for explicit provisions) is likely to affect the
way in which senior employees' interests are supposed to be protected in
nonunion firms and the extent to which this expected protection is in fact
29
delivered.
Despite these potentially important reasons for union—nonunion
differences, a priori logic and union contracts strongly suggest that if
implicit contracts exist, they are very likely to have last—in—first—out
termination provisions accompanying the compensation provisions they would
seem to have.
ll• On the Likely Prevalence and Strength ofImplicit
Last—In—First—Out Layoff Provisions
In this section, we first present the results from our survey of
U.S. firms dealing with their policies concerning permanent layoffs. We
then analyze the terminations of a firm which we have been studying for a
number of years, which in one of these years happened to have a massive
reductionin its exempt workforce.—19—
Results from Our Employer Survey Pertaining to Involuntary Terminations
Evidence used to determine the existence of implicit contract
provisions concerning the order of terminations should meet two criteria.
First, it should reflect the pattern of terminations on a firm—by--firm basis.
When data which do not link individuals to particular enterprises
are used, it is impossible to tell whether any particular termination
is one of a small number at many firms or one in a major cutback
at one firm. This is important because if a weak implicit contract were
operative at most firms, then we would expect senior workers to be more likely
to be terminated in major upheavals. A reasonable guess is that a
high overall layoff rate is more likely to be reflecting major staff reductions
at the relevant f:irms than a low layoff rate, but we cannot be sure.
Differences in the distribution across tenure categories of those employed
at firms experiencing permanent layoffs and those employed at firms not
terminating employees could also lead to misleading results. These factors
prevented the use of some data sets which at first blush seemed to be
obvious sources, namely the PSID and the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS),
Second, the evidence should reflect the arrangements of a sufficiently
large number of firms to allow us to generalize about how permanent layoff
decisions are typically made. To generate the requisite data on the
policies governing terminations among various employee groups at different
firms, we developed and mailed out the employer survey which is reproduced
in Appendix C.—20—
The original sample of firms which were to be sent oursurvey consisted
of 1000 randomly selected companies from the 1979 edition of Standard
and Poor's Register, 200 randomly selected companies from the 1977 News Front
list of the 1,000 largest manufacturing firms and 50 randomly selected
companies from the l977 News F'ront list of the next 2,000 largest. 30 We chose to
oversample manufacturing by adding companies from theNews Front lists to our
Standard and Poor's sample of firms because of the very large fraction of the
economy—wide variation in employment which occurs in this sector. After those
firms from the 1979 Standard and Poor's Register which were foreign based, those
to whom mail was not deliverable at the address given in the 1979 Register,
those not included in the 1980 Register, and those in the News Front sampi that
were also in the Standard and Poor's sample were deleted, we were left with a
mailing list of 884 Standard and Poor's fixtms plus 24lNews Front firms.
Whenever possible, we mailed oursurvey to that individual at each firm
who appeared to be in charge of personnel matters(e.g, the Executive Vice
President for Personnel, the Personnel Director or the IndustrialRelations
Vice President). In cases where no such indiviudal'sname could be obtained,
the letter was sent to the Chief Executive Officer of thecorporation. The
recipient of the letter was told "Since your firm is part of ascientifically
selected sample, it is crucial that we receive aresponse to this very short
questionnaire from you or a colleague who makes decisionsconcerning the
management of human resources." If no response was received from a firm within
a month after our first request was mailed, a secondrequest was sent to the
original contact.—21—
Of the 1125 surveys we mailed out, 2 percent were not deliverable as
addressed; 3 percent were sent back to us by firms that did not satisfy
the criteria specified for participation in the survey; 3 percent
were returned with a refusal; 6 percent were completed and returned but
could not be used because of data problems; 27 percent were otherwise
acceptable but could not be used because they were filled out by respondents
who had no experience with permanent layoffs; and 23 percent were acceptably
completed by respondents who had experience with permanent layQffs. Only
35 percent of those on our mailing list were unaccounted for.
The persons who actually replied to our survey tended to be high—level
corporate executives. Of the 561 people who returned accurately completed survey
forms to us, 7 percent were Chairmen, 29 percent were Presidents, 27 percent
were Vice Presidents, 14 percent were Directors, 11 percent were Managers,
and 12 percent held other titles.
The most important item on the survey is Question 10.
In the event of a reduction in the workforce, would one of the
senior employees in [the largest group of employees who are
affected by your decisions concerning the management ot human
resources ever be involuntarily terminated, that is, laid off
permanently against his or her will, in place of a junior
employee?
i— Yes, if the junior employee was considered a better
L.performerthan the senior employee
riYes,if the junior employee was considered a significantly Ubetterperformer than the senior employee.
No, never.—22—
The emplo\'ee group referred tocouldcon.s.L ofhoucLyemployees, non—exempt
salariedemployees or exempt employees. We also asked whether or not a majority
of those in the affected employee group were covered by a collective bargaining
agreement, whether permanent layoffs had ever been used to reduce the size of
the affected employee group, and, if the previous question was answered "yes",
what proportion of the affected employee group had been terminated in the most
recent two permanent layoffs. In addition, we collected the respondent's
address (from which we created a region variable), number of peopleemployed
by the firm('hic.h in ln units became our size—of—firm measure),and information
on products produced by the firm (from which we constructed industry dummies).
Table 2 summarizesthe responses to our question regarding whethera
junioremployee would ever be involuntarily terminated in place of a senior
employee. In discussing the table, we focus on the economy—wide (except for
agriculture and construction) Standard and Poor's sample. In thissample, the
vast majority of the responses for nonunion employeegroups indicated either
that a senior employee would have to be a giificantlyworse performer than a
junior employee to be laid off first or that a senior employee would never be
laid off before a junior employee; the relevantpercentages are 76 percent of
nonunion hourly responses, 78 percent of non—exempt salariedresponses, and
44 percent of exempt responses. If those makingpermanent layoff decisions
typically use high discount rates (which is not unreasonable asexplained above) anu
if the senior nonunion employees referred to by eachrespondent typically earn more—23--
than junior nonunion employees referred to by thesaue respondents
(as can be expected), then these data are supportive of the claimthat
approximately 70 percent of the nonunion employees in this country (outside
of agriculture and construction) are covered by an implicitcontract
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provision which affords extra protection against job loss to senior workers.
While the frequencies in Table 2 arequite consistent with the
assertion that implicit contract provisionsconcerning the order of
involuntary terminations are not uncommon, they also indicateclearly
that senior workers are most likely to beprotected against losing their
jobs prior to junior workers where there isa collective bargaining
agreement. Even when we limit our comparison to hourlyemployees, we
observe that while almost 76 percent of therespondents discussing non-
union hourlies indicated that a senior employee wouldnot be terminated
before a junior employee unless the junioremployee was at least a
significantly better performer (and at some firms would never be terminated
before a junior employee) almost 95 percent of theresponses Dertaining to
union hourlies fell into this category. This difference isstatistically
significant at the .01 level.
Are some groups of nonunion employees more likely than othersto be
covered by strong implicit contract provisions under whicha firm would
neverterminatea senior employee prior to his/her junio.r co—worker? Our
survey results imply that this type of strong protection is much more prevalent
for nonunion hourly employees than for nonunion salariedemployees. In the
Standard and Poor's sample, almost 28 percent of theresponses for nonunion
hourly employees, but fewer than 6 percent of those fornonexempt salaried
employees and none of those for exempt employees, indicated thata senior
employee would never be terminated before a junior employee. Bothhourly
versus salaried differences are significant at the .01 level.—24—
Our survey results also imply that very strong protection, such
that a senior employee would never be permanently laid off beforea
junior employee, is very much more prevalent under unionisli. Even when
only hourly employees are considered, the responses from the Standardand
Poor's sample suggest that 68 percent of unionhourly employees (outside
agriculture and construction) work in settings where the senior worker
would never be let go before a juniorworker; the comparable figure
for nonunion hourly workers, asreported above, is 28 percent. This
difference is significant at the .01 level.
The responses to our employersurvey can also be used to address
the following questions, which seem mostpertinent to the issues at hand:
Can the apparent union—nonunion differentialin the extent of protection
against involuntary termination afforded seniorhourly employees be explained
solely in terms of the types of settings in which unionsare likely to
exist? How is the union—nonunion differential inthe extent of this protection
related to the fraction of the relevant workforcepermanently laid off
(which can be assumed to mirror, albeitvery imperfectly, the ex post costs
inoived in providingthe insurance under consideration)?Is the operat ion of
alast—in—first—outpermanent layoff policy for exempt employees,among whom
the overpayment (underpayment) of senior(junior) employees seems to be
especially large, likely to depend to a muchgreater extent on the economic
climate than it does for other nonunionemployees? To address these questions,
we combined the Standard and Poor's and NewsFront samples and fit the
models whose key parameter estimatesare presented in Table 3.—25—
Models 1 and 2 in Table 3 indicate that the probability thata senior
employeemight be permanently laid off if a junior employee was a betrer
performer is significantly and substantially higher for employees not
covered by a collective bargaining agreement than for coveredemployees, even
whenfirmsize, broad industry and geograpli-ic region (ir Noc!1 1)orthe-e
samefactors plus size of largest permanent layoff (jjc-jrjj2).ne
controlled for. The estimated coefficients in Model I (Model 2)
implythat,at the total sample mean values of the other dependent
variables, the probability that a senior hourly worker covered by
a collective bargaining agreement might be laid off before a better—
performing junior co—worker is .059 (.057). For a senior hourly worker
not covered by a collective bargaining agreemént,theorregondjngprhability
is .156 (.148); for a senior salaried non—exempt employee, .226(.253); and
for a senior exempt employee, .419 (.417).
It is interèsing tha, at least in model 1, large firms anear
to be significantly less likely to terminate senior employees ahead of
junior employees who are better performers. One very tentative interpret-
ation of the negative coefficient on ln(number of persons emDloyed by the
firm)mightbe that large firms incur greater costs if they violate an
implicit contract provision concerning order of termination because their
acts aremorevisible. If the fraction laid off in a firm's largest
permanent layoff can be considered an acceptable proxy for the severity
ofthe worst economic conditions a firm has faced, the significant
positive coefficient on that variable suggests that, as expected, firms
that have facedvery badeconomic conditions are less likely to have
protectedsenior employees from being terminated before junior employees
who are better performers.—26—
Model 3, by including interactions of employee groups with size of
largest layoff, provides a modicum of evidence about the strength of
implicit contracts by examining the extent to which they seem to protect
senior workers as economic conditions, imperfectly measured, worsen.
While the exempt employee interaction coefficient just misses statistical
significance, the point estimate suggests that senior exempt employees are
substantially more likely than hourly employees covered by a collective
bargaining agreement to become increasingly vulnerable when economic conditions
worsen. While our estimated coefficients are not precise, they are consistent
with the claim that implicit contract provisions protecting senior exempt
employees? jobs are weaker than implicit contract provisions rotecting the
jobs of other nonunion employees.
As discussed above, one can also try to assess the prevalence of strong
contract provisions concerning the order of terminations by looking at the
pattern of "no never" responses to our question about whether senior employees
would be permanently laid off before junior employees. We should perhaps
mention that when we pooled the Standard and Poor's and News Front responses
for hourly employees and fit a probit model whfch had a dependent variable
equal to 1 if a senior worker would never be permanently laid off before a
junior worker and which controlled (as in Table 3) for major industry, region,
firm size, and size of downturn we found that the probability of having this
very strong type of senior worker protection was substantially (and significantly)
greater under explicit union contracts. At the total sample means the
probabilities were .627 for those covered by collective bargaining agreements
and .323 for those not covered.—27--
Analysisof ExemptWorforceReduction at
The cross—sectional data from thesurvey was used to draw inferences about how
an individual firm with the relevant implicit contract provision might change
its order of layoffs in response to changes in economic conditions.However,
only longitudinal data can demonstrate explicitly how patterns ofinvoluntary
terminations vary with economic conditions under any one trovision. To
this end, we examined the changing patterns ofpermanent layoffs among the
exempt employees at a major U.S. corporation which we have studied over an
extended period. This examination is especially rich since inone of the years
during which we happened to be analyzing the company, it terminateda very
oihstantlaifract ion of its exempt workforc,
The models presented in Table 4describe
the pattern of involuntary terminationsamong white male managerial and
professionalemployees at Company B's corporate headquarters during a recent
year in which the termination rate was normal and during the
following six months in which the termination rate wasextremely high. The
contrast between th t-io periods is striking. In thenormal—layoff period, exmDt
employees with greater—than--average service were no more or perhaps lesslikely to be
involuntarily terminated than exempt employees with less—than—average
service. In the high—layoff period, probability of beinginvoluntarily
terminated was strongly and positively related to seniority. These resultsare con-
sistent with the following two claims: '(1) Under normalcircumstances, the jobs of
senior exempt employees at Company B are protected by an implicitcontract
provision regarding terminations; and (2) This implicit provision, if it in fact
exists, is not strong enough to protect senior exempt mpioyèe jobs In the event of
a major cutback. That is, the findings are consistent with the assertionthat a weak
implicit c,ntract proision protects the jobs of B's senior exempt employees.
Company B's net income ns more than L percent cwern eal termr
incalandar year tthanin calendar year t—l. During the first halt of-2 8—
calendar year t + 1, a new chief executive officer took charge of thecompany
and decided that, in light of the firm's econoricposition, its work force
should be substantially trimmed. No change in the basicnature of the enter-
prise was contemplated; rather, manpower requireents were to bereduced
through consolidati3n of operations, particularly at thecorporate head--
quarters level. Those responsible for deciding who should be terminated
were instructed that past performance and ability to perform in the revised
organization were the basic factors they ought to consider in drawing
up their list. Only 2.2 percent of the white males who had held exempt
positions at Company B headquarters as of May 31 of year t wereinvoluntarily
terminated during the following year. In contrast, 12.3percent of the
white males who had held exempt positons at Company B headquartersas of May
31 of year t + 1 were involuntarily terminated during the subsequent
six months and l77 percent were notified that they were on the list
of those to be severed as part of the consolidation process initiated
by the new chief executive officer.
Tablepresents two sets of models for assessing the effect of
tenure on the probability of a white male holding an exempt position
at Company B headquarters losing his job, one set with no grade level
dummies included (quations 1, 3 and 5) and one set including grade
level dummies (Equations 2,4 and 6). One of our earlier studies (Medoff
and Abraham l980a) focused on the within—grade—level relation-
ships between company service and relative salary and between company
service and relative performance for exempt employees at Company B, As
discussed in Section I, none of the substantial within—grade—level earningsadvantage
associated with company service could be explained by the better performance
of long tenure employees. Thus, we have especially good reason to
believe that the net value of those Company B exemptemployees in any r&de level
who have more service is substantially below that of those in thesame grade
level who have less service.-.29-.
Equations 1 and 2 indicate that in the lowterniination neriocl fror
June1 of year ttoNay 31 of year t+ 1,long—service employees were
protected from being involuntarily terminated. None of the estimated
tenure dummy coefficients in either the first or second model (one with no grade
level dummies and the other controlling for grade level) issignificantly
different from zero. The point estimates suggest that, all else the
same, employees with more than 10 years of service were less likely to
be terminated than eITlployees with 3 to 10 years service. These results,
in conjunction with the findings pertaining toperformance versus pay for
less senior and for more senior employees discussedabove, are consistent
with the claim than an implicit employmnntcontract provision concerning the order
of involuntary terminations covers the relevantgroup of employees at Company B.
Equations 3 and 4 analyze the probability of actually having been
laid off between June 1 and November 30 ofyear t + 1 and Equations 5 and 6
focus on the probability of being chosen to beterminated during the same
period. These four equations show a very differentpattern than Equations 1 and 2.
Whether or not grade level is heldconstant, there is a strong positive association
between company service and probability of either actualor scheduled tennination,
which is exactly what would be expected if thecompany made its termination decisions
on a purelymeritocratic or (current) net value basis. TheEquation 3 coefficient
estimates imply that employees with more than 30years of service, but otherwise
average characteristics, are 3.56 times as likely to be laid offas employees
with 3 to 10 years; the Equation 4 coefficientestimates, that they are 4.59
times as likely; the 1'quation 5 coefficientestimates, that they are 3.25 times
as likely; and the Equation 6 coefficientestimates, that they are 3.89 times
as likely. We are led to conclude that ifany implicit contract provision
32 protects thejobsof senior exempt employees at Company B, it isa weak one.—30--
IV. Conclusions and Directions
In the preceding pages, we have investigated where and when last—in—first—
out permanent layoff policies seem to go hand in hand with compensation policies
under which the net value of senior workers appears to be less than that of their
junior peers.
Our investigation yielded three seemingly important findings about
employment relationships in the U.S. First, roughly 70 percent of our country's non-
union workforce (outside of agriculture and construction) appears to be employed where
last—in-first—out termination policies go hand in hand with compensation policies
under which employees with less—than—average company service are paid below the value of
theircurrent contribution and those with greater—than—average service are paid above
it. Second, the probability that a group of workers is covered by a policy under
which protection against job loss grows with company service eventhough net value
to the firm does not is greater under unionism, even when we limit the comparison
to hourly employees in the same broad industry and region working for similar—
sized companies. Overall, approximately 95 percent of union members outside of
agriculture andconstruction work under such a policy. Taken together, our
figures for nonunion employeesand for union employees imply tha. about 80
-
percentof our country's total (nonagricultural, nonconstruction) wotkforce
work in settings where senior employees receive extra protection against job
loss. Third, the provisions under which job security is supposed to increase
with seniority appear to be "stronger" when part of a collective bargaining
contract; that is, even when we examine (roughly) comparable employees, the probability
that a senior worker would ever be terminated (no matter how bad the economic conditions)—31—
before his/her junior co—workerappears to be substantially
lower under unionism. While senior nonunionemployees have some
protection against losing their jobs prior to theirjunior colleagues,
it seems much less likely to be "crisisproof" than thatenjoyed by senior
union members.
It is our belief that, for better orworse, our research has raised
as many questions for enterprising empiricists as it hasanswered: Can
the other necessary conditions required for the existence ofweak implicit
contract provisions concerning the order of permanent job losses be shownto
hold? How can we explain the apparent union—nonuniondifferential, even among
comparable groups of employees, in the extent to which firms have last—in—f irst—
out permanent layoff procedures in general and those whichare strong in
particular? Is the ordering by seniority of permanent layoffs observedamong
unionized workers closer to an "efficient" ordering than what is observedin
nonunion settings? What is it about a trade union that moves collective
bargaining contracts closer to or further away from an etficient. employment
contract ?
Thesequestions indicate, at least to us, that the empirical, research
on implicit employment contracts, as on most issuescurrently being
discussed by economists, has lagged far behind the theoreticalwork. The
questionsthemselves suggest that to close thisgap effort must be channeled
in two directions: First, more data onhow individuals'utility and firms' productivity
are affected by the events about which we do much theorizing must becollected.
Second, more information about the institutions which seem togreatly condition
economic outcomes must be generated. We believe thatas this evidence
is collected, the real answers to thequestions raised here and elsewhere
in our discipline will beforthcoming.32
Footnotes
1The evidence for this claim ispresented in section I below.
2Our use of the term "implicit contract" parallels Baily's (1974) and Azariadis'
(1975) use of the term in another context.
3Becker and Stigler (1974) and Lazear (1979) developa line of argument
in which deterrence of worker cheating motivates entrance into this sort
of implicit contract. Salop and Salop (1976) and Viscusi (1978) suggest
that steep wage profiles might serve as a self—selection device. A
number of other possible hypotheses are outlined in Medoff and Abraham
(1980a) and Halasz (1980).
4Section II below providessupport for this claim.
5To establish the existence of an implicit contract provision pertaining
to the order of permanent layoffs, one would want to show that each of
the following three conditions was satisfied. First, the firm's decision
to enter into the implicit contract which has the provision should be
based on an ex ante profit maximizing calculus. This condition merely
makes our use of the term "implicit contract" consistent with other authors'
use of the term in other contexts. Second, there should be at least some
states of the world such that, in the absence of any implicit contract
provision concerning the order of terminations, but all else the same, the
firm could earn higher profits by laying off a different set of workers
than the implicit contract would say should be laid off. Otherwise, there
would be no point in having the implicit termination provision. Third,
both the firm and its employees should know what the terms of the contract
provision are and whether those terms are being adhered to. The second of
these necessary conditions ii-; the only one anlayzed in this study.—33—
61t shouldperhaps be emphasized that to the extent that the strength of an
implicit contract provision concerning order of layoffs can be observed,
it will reflect both the terms of the relevant contract and the degree to
which those terms are adhered to. In this paper, we make no effort to
separate out the roles played by the terms of implicit contracts and by
adherence to those terms.
7For a more detailed discussionof our survey methodology and results,
see Medoff and Abraham (l980c).
8Adding controls for education,region, and pre—company experience did not
appreciably affect these findings. We also estimatedseparate ln (wage)
regressions for union and nonunion blue collar workers. Theresults
of this estimation indicate that while theearnings ratio of those with
more than 20 years tenure to those with 3 to 10years was smaller under
unionismin 1971, it was larger under unionism in 1974.
9
Because we felt it was important to make our review ofrelevant work
as comprehensive as possible, we decided to include inAppendix B studies
which focused on the relationships ofage to productivity and experiance
to productivity as well as those which looked at therelationship of
length of service to productivity. In all of the datasets analyzed for
this paper (Company C's exempt employee data, the PSIDdata and Company
B's exempt employee data), both age and experiencewere highly correlated
with tenure. It would be surprising if the relationship oftenure to productivity
for those groups covered by the age andexperience studies differed
greatly from the reported relationship of age or experience toproductivity.
10
The criterion that the unit of observation be an individual has led
us to exclude a number of studies which examine aggregate data.
We know of several educational production function studies which
relate the average test scores ofgroups of students to their teachers'
average experience; all of them provide results which imply—34--
a flat or negative relationship between teachers' "productivity" and
their experience after a couple of years of teaching. The one relevant
non—educational study that we know of was an analysis of 100
unionized grocery stores done by Walter A. Fogel (1964); this research
concluded that unit labor costs were higher in those stores with more
senior personnel, which implies that senior grocery store employees
were not sufficiently more productive than junior grocery store employees
to compensate for their higher salaries.
Exempt employees are those in executive, administrative, professional
or outside sales jobs and exempt from the overtime provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards and Walsh—Healy Acts.
12
See Medoff and Abraham (1980a and forthcoming) for a more thorough
defense of the proposition that performance ratings are valid indicators
of relative productivity.
should be noted that none of these resultsprovide unbiased estimates
of the effect of company service on either relative pay or relative
productivity. This is because more able individuals are most likely promoted
more rapidly than otherwise similar but less able individuals, especiallyamong exempt
employees (see Medoff and Abraham l980b). Thus, even if in any workforce
considered as a whole, service was positively related to value marginalproduct,
within a grade level where merit played some role in. promotions,one would expect long-
er—service employees to be less able than shorter—service employees andas a result to
perform no better. However, if an individual'spay equalled his value marginal product
at each point in time, seniority should also have anon—positive partial relationshin
to within—grade—level salary; these results show that it doesnot. Thus, we can conclude
that senior employees in the relevant populationsare most likely paid more than their
value marginal product.
14The instrument itself ispresented in Appendix C below.—35—
15Thjsfigure is based on the responses from the representative Standard and Poor's
sample discussed below. See Medoff and Abraham (l980c) for a precise statement of
how this figure was derived.
16
Evidence supporting this claim is presented in Medoff and Abraham (1980b).
first blush it might appear that c should also appear in (3). However,
jt0
sincewe have assumed that a firm will not terminate a worker and then replace him/her
during the same period, the present value of the costs of replacing a terminated
employee will approach zero as r+(Tt ).0
18
The assumption that business decisionmakers typically employa very
high discount rate (very short planning horizon) is consistent with
much recent writing in the business press. For example, the June 30,
1980 issue of Business Week states that:
"There isaschizophrenia pervading U.S. business today. It is a
rare CEO who has not publicly expounded on the need for focusing
on the future——usually couched within a speech castigating govern-
ment or labor unions for their short—term policies. Yet the
compensation systems in their companies, the financial require-
ments for investment projects, the criteria for management—by—
objectives goals and for performance appraisal, all point to an
exceedingly short—term orientation." (pp. 74—75).
In addition, it should be pointed out that
earlier empirical work pertaining to the relationship betweenlayoffs
and seniority has always, at least insofaras we are aware, implicitly
or explicitly assumed that firms use an infinite discountrate (ona
period time horizon) in deciding who to terminate,See, for example,
Parsons (1972) and Mincer and Jovanovic (1979), both of whichargue that
layoffs are principally related to thegap that specific human capital
investments are hynothesized to produce between currentwage and current
value marginal product.36
19
The d.'s capture what supervisors.ought to havebeen thinking about
when theycodcci their subordinates' quits as "regretted" "nonregretted"
or "encouraged". However, when we circulated a questionniare to 15
Company C employee relations managers to ask them what factors they
thought supervisors considered when making regretted/nonregretted
decisions, 13 marked "HOW much the person was contributing to (Company C)"
and 2 marked "Whether the person's specialized skills would be easy
or difficult to replace" as the most important factors. "The person's
potential future contribution to (Company C) was marked by 7 of the 15
managers as the second most important factor influencing regretted/non—
regretted decisions. No one said that "How much the person was
contributing to (Company C) relative to what he or she was being paid"
mattered and only 1 person said that "...how the person's contibution
to (Company C) a few years out would most likely have compared to his
or her earnings" mattered. These responses suggest that the regretted!
nonregretted codes might alternatively be interpreted as capturing
quitters' relative current productivity.
20
Wearegrateful to Jeffrey Zax for his skilled work on the development
of this maximum likelihood model. Gary Chamberlain, Bronwyn Hall, and
Jerry Hausman also gave us helpful advice.
21
The maximum likelihood model estimated for Table 1 includes in (annual
salary), whether ever married, number of children under 18 and whether
participating in the company thrift plan in the quit equation, but
does not include these variables in the regret equation. While we
felt these exclusions to be structurally appropriate, it was not the
case that the omitted variables assumed zero coefficients when they
were allowed to enter the regret equation. We reestimated our
maximum likelihood model without any exclusions and then calculated37
4
tenure dummy coefficents equal to 13.+k=l k'
where i indicates the tenure group; k indexes the variables excluded
from our original models; the 13's are coefficients from the regret
k
equation in our modified maximum likelihood model; and the y s are
coefficients from regressions of each of the originally excluded variables
on all of the other explanatory variables in the new regret equation,
estimated for a representative sample of the Company C workforce. This
procedure produced estimated coefficients of .270 for the 0 to 3 years of
tenure dummy, —.137 for the 10 to 20 years dummy and —.656 for the more
ti-ian 20 years dummy.
22Nedoff and Abraham(forthcoming) provides evidence which strongly
supports the claim that Company C has a deferred compensation policy for
the group of employees under analysis.
23For a review of some of this evidence,see Freeman and Medoff (1980).
24The figuresconcerning layoff procedures are from U.S. Department of Labor
1972, pp. 53-54).
25For evidence on the early importance of contractprovisions stipulating that layoffs
would be in accordance with length of service, see Slichter (1941, pp. 115—122).
For a discussion of the history of severance pay plans, see Slichter, Healy and
Livernash (1960, pp. 463—469).
26Thjs estimate is from U.S.Department of Labor (1978, p. 101).
27Thjs fact becomesapparent when one examines the industrial locus of
last—in—first—out layoff provisions and the industrial locus of severance
pay plans.
28This point is discussed at some lengtli in Freeman and Medoff (1980). Its
relevance to union /nonunion differences in the importance of layoffs for labor
adjustment is addressed. in Medoff (1979). It is also central to
the interesting recent study by Blau and Kahn (1980) who used 1969to 1971 National
Longitudinal Survey data for younger men (aged 17 to 27) and for older
mea (aged 48 to 62) to compare and contrast the impact of collective38
bargaining on layoff probabilities among the two groups. Their results for
permanent layoffs are consistent with the claim that during the sharp
downturn from 1969 to 1971, as during the one from 1974 to 1975, the
vulnerability to job loss of those with long service relative to those
with short service was substantially lower under unionism.
It should be mentioned that it is possible that the nonunion preference
distribution is more skewed toward present—oriented policies than the
union distribution. While this possibility cannot be ruled out a priori,
it would seem to become remote as the number of firm and worker controls grows.
29
In contrast to employees who are protected by implicit employment contract
provisions pertaining to order of permanent layoffs, those who have entered with
their employers into explicit employment contracts dealing with the same issue
can turn to the courts for enforcement. In nonunion settings, senior workers
usually have no legal protection against being laid off before their junior
compatriots. Ignoring situations where a termination has been predicated on
a consideration expressly made unlawful by statute (i.e., sex, race, religion,
national origin, age, union organizational activity, or protected concerted
activity),nonunion employment relationships are generally "terminable at
will," regardless of how long an employee has been with his/her employer.
Evena written company manual stating that layoffs will occur in inverse
order of years of company service will not generally be viewed as an
enforceable contract; employers in virtually all jurisdictions have the right to
alter this "policy't at any time. The one jurisdiction we knowof forwhich this is not
the case is Michigan. The Nichigan Supreme Court recently held that "an—39—
employer's express agreement to terminate only for cause, or statements
of company policy and procedure to that effect, can give rise to rights
enforceable in contract," in Toussaint v. Blue Cross, as reported in
Bureau of National Affairs (1980, p. 2823). A senior employee who was in-
voluntarily terminated in violation of a union contract would have legal recourse.
3C
The 1979 Standard and Poor's Register listed companies whiéh In 1978 had sales
of at least $1,000,000 and/or 50 employees and asked to be listed. The 1977
News Front listing of the largest 3,000 manufacturing companies was based on the
companies 1974 sales; this listing was the most recent one available at the
time our sample was drawn.
31Throughout the paper, our aggregatesurvey results were derived with weights
based on weighted counts of private sector wage and salary employees working
outside of agriculture and construction obtained from the May 1978 Current
Population Survey (CPs). While the CPS would have permitted us to construct
separate weights for non—hourly nonunion employees and non—hourly union employees,
we received no responses to our survey which pertained to a non—hourly union
group. Our aggregation procedure, which implicitly assumes that the
responses for non—hourly union employees would look like the responses for
non—hourly nonunion employees, most likely leads to a slight understatement
of union/nonunion differentials for the labor forceas a whole.40
32Clearly it would be valuable to obta informationon the pattern of
exempt employee terminations during large cutbacks at other firms besides Company
B. We do know of at least two additional instances where it had been
reported that a disproportionate number of senior managerial and professional
employees were terminated during retrenching periods. However, the
companies involved would be very unlikely to want to share their data with us;
exempt terminations are typically an extremely touchy subject with
corporate officials. Furthermore, if we studied firms that we knew had
very likely terminated a high proportion of their senior employees, finding
that they had in fact done so would not be too surprising. The Company B
results are particularly interesting because we were able to observe their
layoff as it occured rather than selecting it for study, and because we
had access to information in addition to the relevant computerized
microdata file which indicated that the company took every step possible
to make the cutback meritocractic (that is, based on net value).
33Theconcept of an "efficient" emploent contract is at the heart of
the provocative paper by Hall (1980); his piece contains otherrelevant
references.41
REFERENCE S
Azariadis, Costas. "Implicit Contracts and Unemployment Equilibria." Journal
of Political Economy 83, no. 6 (December 1975): 1183—1202.
Baily, Martin. "Wages and Employment Under Uncertain Demand." Review of
Economic Studies 41, no. 125 (January 1974): 37—50.
Becker, Gary S., and Stigler, George J. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and
Compensation of Enforcers." Journal of Legal Studies 3, no. 1 (1974): 1—18.
Blau, Francine D., and Kahn, Lawrence M. "Union Coverage, Seniority and Layoffs."
Mimeographed. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1980.
Bureau of National Affairs. U.S. Law Week (June 24, 1980): 2823.
Freeman, Richard B., and Medoff, James L. "The Two Faces of Unionism." The
Public Interest, no. 57 (Fall 1979): 69—93.
Fogel, Walter A. "Job Rate Ranges: A Theoretical and Empirical Mialysis."
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 17, no. 4 (July 1964): 584—597.
Griliches, Zvi; Hall, Bronwyn; and Hausman, Jerry. "Missing Data and Self Selection in
Large Panels." Annales de L'INSEE, no. 30—31 (April —September1978): 137—186.
Hall, Robert E. "Employment Fluctuations and
Wage Rigidity." Brookins Papers
on Economic Activity, no. 1 (1980): 91—123.
Halasz, Peter Jonathan. "What Lies Behind the Slope of the Age—Earnings Profile."
Senior honors thesis, Harvard College, 1980.
Heckman, James D. "The Common Structure of Statistical Models ofTruncation,
Sample Selection, and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator
for Such Models." Annals of Economics and Social Measurement 5, no. 4 (1976):
475—492.
Lazear, Edward P. "Why is There Mandatory Retirement?" Journal of Political
Economy 87, no. 6 (December 1979): 1261—1284.
"Managers who are no longer entrepreneurs." Business Week, (June 30, 1980): 74—75.42
Medoff, James L. "The Earnings Function: A Glimpse Insidethe Black Box."
Mimeographed. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1977.
"Layoffs and Alternatives Under Trade Unions in U.S.Manufacturing."
American Economic Review 69, no. 3 (June 1979): 380—395.
_____________andAbraham, Katharine C. "Experience, Performance, andEarnings."
Quarterly Journal of Economics 95, no. 4 (December 1980): 703—736.(a)
_______________and ."AreThose Paid More R?a1ly More
Poductjve?: The Case of Experience." Journal of
Human Resources, forthcoming.
________________and_____________________."Yearsof Service and Probability of
Promotion." Mimeographed. Cambridge: HarvardUniversity, 1980. (U)
_______________and _______________."TheRole of Seniority at U.S. Work
Places:A Report on Some New Evidence." Mimeographed.Cambridge:
Harvard University, 1980. (c)
Mincer, Jacob and Jovanovic, Boyan. "Labor
Mobility and Wages." Working Paperno. 357,
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1979.
Parsons,DonaljO. "Specific Human Capital: AnApplication to Quit Rates and Layoff
Rates." Journal of Political Economy 80,no. 6 (December 1972): 1120—1148.
Salop, Joanne and Salop, Steven. "Self—Selection and Turnoverin the Labor Market."
,Qrterly Journal of Economics 90, no. 4 (November 1976):619—627.
Slichter, Sumner H. Union•Poljcjes and IndustrialManagement
Washington: Brookings,
1941.
Healy, James S.; and Livernash, E. Robert. The Impact of
Qollective Bargaining on Management. Washington:Brookings, 1960.43
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Layoff, Recall
and Worksharing Procedures."
jor Collective Bargaining Agreements. Bulletin No. 1425—13.Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1972.
Characteristics of MajorCollectiveBargaining
Agreements, Bulletin no. 2065.Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1980.
Viscusi, W. Kip. "Self—Selection, Learning—Induced Quits, and the Optimal
Wage Structure." Mimeographed. Evanston: Northwestern University, 1978.
Yanker, Robert H., Jr. "Productivity Versus Seniority: What is the Determining
Factor in Regard to Wages and Promotion?" Senior honors thesis, Harvard
College, 1980.—44—
TABLE1
EFFECT OF TENUREAND SELECTEDOTHER VARIABLES ON
THE PROBABILITY OF AN EXEMPT COMPANYCEMPLOYEE'S QUIT BEING REGRETTED
Probit Equationa Maximum Likelihoodb
(N =844) Model
(N11,054)
Less than 3 years tenure (yesl) .220 .182
(.120) (.110)
10 to 20 years tenure (yesl) —.057 —.194
(.151) (.149)
More than 20 years tenure (yesl) —.301 —.644
(.335) (.299)
Less than a bachelor's degree (yesl) .140 —.058
(.170) (.167)
Master's or law degree (yes=l) —.081 —.057)
(.119) (.113)
Doctorate (yes=l) —.586 —.528
(.235) (.211)
Quit in 1974 (yes=l) .194 .113
(.117) (.110)
Quitin 1975 (yes=l) —.159 —.261
(.128) (.120)
Pre—companyexperience dummies 2 2
Region dummies 3 3
Gradelevel dummies 9 9
89.1 1525.2
21 44
a At Company C, almost every managerial or professional resignation from 1973 through
1975 was coded as "regretted," "nonregretted," or "encouraged"; mall, usable data was
available for 844 white male exempt quitters who had been employed in regular full—time
jobs in the continental United States prior to leaving Company C. The dependent variable
in our probit equation was set equal to 1 if an individual's quit was "regretted" and to
O otherwise. All of the independent variables reflect individuals' status as of the
date they left the company.
b The maximum likelihood model which generated the results presented in the table
corrects for possible sample selection bias present in the single equation probit estimates.
The sample used in estimating the model consists of white males active as of January 1,
1973 and employed in regular full—time managerial or professional jobs in the continental
United States as of that date plus white males who were hired or transferred into such
jobs anytime between January 1, 1973 and December 31, 1975. One part of the maximum
likelihood model specifies probability of quitting as a ftinction of tenure, pre—company
experience, education, region of residence, ln (annual salary) whether ever married, number
of children under 18, and whether participating in the company thrift plan. All of the
quit variables reflect individuals' status as of January 1, 1973 (for those in exempt
postions at the company as of that date) or as of 'at transferrred or hired into an
exempt position (for those moving into the exempt ranks after January 1, 1973). The
second part of the model specifies probability of an in'lividual's quit being regretted
as a function of variables shown in the table. All of the regret variables reflect
individuals' status as of the time they left the company.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FACTORS AFFECTING THEPROBABILITYTHATASENIOR WORKER
NIGHT BE INVOLUNTARILY TERMINATED BEFORE A JUNIOR
WORKERIF THE JUNIOR WORKER WAS A BETTER PERFORMER
(ALLEMPLOYEES)
Dependent Variable =1 if
a Senior Worker MayBe
Permanently Laid Of fif a





Deviation] 1 2 3
[ourly employees not covered by .267 .549 .539 .128
collective bargaining agree— [.443] (.271) (.273) (.383)
ient (yes =1)
Ion—exempt salaried employees .109 .808 .918 1.083
yes 1) [.312] (.356) (.361) (.486)
xempt employees (yes 1) .136 1.354 1.373 .820
[.343] (.314) (.316) (.449)
'raction laid off in largest .117 1.354 —.698
ermanent layoff [.140] (.687) (1.712)
[ourly not covered by a collective .037 2.615
argaining agreement by fraction [.111] (1 944)
aid off in largest permanent layoff
Eon—exempt salaried employees .007 —3.765
n largest permanent layoff [.035] (4.230)
xempt x fraction laid off in largest .013 6.039
ermanent layoff [.057] (3.761)
n(number of persons employed 6.89 —.104 —.080 —.105
)thefirm) [2.06 (.054) (.056) (.O6l
:ndustry dummiesb 3 3 3
legiondummiesb 3 3 3
39.4 43.2 50.6
10 11 14
a All of the models estimated for this table were probit equations. The mean of
:he dependent variable is .167.
b The industry categories are manufacturing (omitted), transportation and communication,
:iade and other industries. The regions are north central (omitted), northeast, south and west.
[ote: Standard errors are enclosed in parentheses below coefficient estimates.TABLE 4
EFFECT OF TENURE ON THE PROBABILITY OF LOSING JOB DURING A YEAR WITH "FEW"









BetweenJune 1, t+1 and November













a All of the models estimated for this table were probit equations. The samples used to
estimate the models consist of white male Company B employees who worked at regular full—
time managerial or professional jobs in the continental U.S. as of either May 31 of year t
(models 1 and 2) or May 31 of year t + 1 (models 3 through 6). The dependent variables
are as specified in the table and the independent variables are based on information for
either Nay 31 of year t or May 31 of year t + 1. The dependent variable for models 1 and 2
has a mean value of .022; that for models 3 and 4 ,amean value of .123; and that for
models 5 and 6, a mean value of .177. Of those in the first (second) sample, 14.1 percent
(14.0 percent) had less than 3 years tenure as of May 31 of year t (May 31 of year t +1);
28.4 percent (25.4 percent) had 3 to 10 years tenure; 26.4 percent (28.6 percent) had 10
to 20 years tenure; 22.3 percent (22.3 percent) had 20 to 30 years tenure; and 8.8 percent
(9.8 percent) had more than 30 years tenure.
b We did not introduce a full set of grade level controls in either model 2 or model 4
because in a number of grade levels there was no one for whom the relevent dependent variable
equalled 1.
Note: Standard errors are enclosed in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
....(2). (3) (4) (5) (6)
2robit equation specification:b
Less than 3 years tenure
(yes1)
10 to 20 years tenure
(yes1)
20to 30 years tenure
(yesl)






— .062 —.154 — .045 —.081 —.001 —.084
(.243)(.254)(.171)(.179)(.156)(.165)
—.245 —.273 —.024 .020 .086 .150
(.227)(.239)(.137)(.141)(.123)(.127)
—.248 —.183 .3O .410 .320 .412
(.249)(.261)(.139)(.146)(.128)(.134)
—.268 —.260 .8621.025 .903 1.039
(.411)(.423)(.170)(.178)(.158)(.165)
3 3 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2 2 2
0 8 0 12 0 14
x 9.2 18.4 52.4 85.5 67.3101.1 d.f. 9 17 9 21 9 23
Estimated probability of a sample
member with the indicated amount of
tenure and otherwise average
characteristics losing job:
Less than 3 years tenure .023 .015 .080 .062 .122 .094
3 to 10 years tenure .026 .022 .087 .073 .122 .109
10 to 20 years tenure .015 .011 .083 .075 .140 .140
20 to 30 years tenure .014 .014 .145 .148 .199 .206 More than 30years tenure .014 .012 .309 .333 .397 .423______________ 48
APPENDIXA]
THE RELATIONSHIP OF TENURE TO LN (HOURLY WAGE)










(N =479) (N =241) (N =541) (N =278)
Mean (standard deviation)









Proportion of sample with:
Less than 3 years tenure
3 to 10 years tenure
10 to 20 years tenure


















Less than 3 years tenure
(yes 1)
10 to 20 years tenure
(yes =1)


























Industry dummies 10 10 10 10
Occupation dummies 2 1 2 1
R .274 .174
a All of the models estimated for this table were ordinary least square regressions. Each of
the samples consisted of male residents of the continental U.S. who were employed full—time in
the private sector as of the relevant interview date in industries other than agriculture and
construction, reported a wage of $1.60 per hour or greater, and were in appropriate occupations.
4embers of households in the PSID low income samples were excluded from the analysis. The 1971
(1974) regressions have ln(Average Hourly Wage) during 1970 (1973) as the dependent variable
and independentvariables derived from information given at the time of the 1971 (l974' inteiview.
Tote: Standard errors are enclosed in parentheses below coefficient estimates.APPENDIX B
49































Data on salary, performance rating assigned by supervisor, job grade
level and individual characteristics for several thousand white male
employees at each of two large companies were taken from those
companies' computerized personnel files. At both companies
approximately 40 percent of the higher earnings associated with
seniority took the form of higher earnings within grade level. While
additional company service beyond the mean amount increased the
probability of being towards the top of the within—grade—level salary
distribution, it decreased the probability of being towards the top of
the within—grade—level performance distribution.
Cross—sectional results virtually identical to those in Medoff and
Abraham (forthcoming a) were obtained with data for approximately
8,000 exempt employees of a third large company. In addition, analysis
of longitudinal data on pay and performance revealed that, for those
staying in the same job grade level over time, relative within—grade—
levelsalary rose but relative within—grade—level rated performance
fell.
Salary, performance rating, job gradelevel and information on
individualcharacteristics were taken from approximately 300 non-exempt
employees'personnel records. For these employees, approximately 50
percent of the return to seniority took the form of higher earnings
within grade level. Additional company service beyond the mean
amount increased the probability of being towards the top of the within—
grade—level salary distribution but decreased the probability of being
towards the top of the within—grade--level performance distribution.
Data on hourly rate of pay, productivity, job grade level and individual
characteristics for approximately 400 workers were taken from their
personnel records. The productivity measure was equal to the time the
worker took to do his/her job divided by the standard time for performing
the job. Approximately 80 percent of the earnings return to seniority
occurred within job grade level; none of this within—grade—level
return could be explained on the basis of more senior workers
having higher productivity.
Performance ratings for approximately 200 persons hired over a six
year period were used in the analysis. Other factors the same,
years in supervisory position had a positive affect on rated
performance. However, the mean amount of company service among
































Cross—sectional data for a random sample of U.S. scientists in six
disciplines showed a peak among those aged 40 to 44 both in mean
number of papers published and in the importance of published'orks
as measured by number of citations. However,all differences
in mean output between adjacent age groups were verysmall.
Longitudinal data for the cohort of U.S. mathemeticianswho got
their Ph.D.'s between 1947 and 1950 showed norelationship between
time since receiving Ph.D. and either number of publidationSor
number of citations to those publications.
Cross—sectional results very similar to those in Medoff and Abraham
(forthcoming a) were obtained using data for approximately 800 managers
employed by an airline.
The change between third grade and sixth grade inindividual students'
composite achievement score on the Iowa Test ofBasic Skills
was used as a measure of educational output.Sixth grade teachers'
experience was measured in years up to 11 years.A total of 627 usuable
observations were obtained. Controlling for other factors,students
whose thid grade scores were above the norm benefittedfrom additional
sixth grade teacher experience, but among those with third grade scores
below the norm, additional teacher experience was associatedwith smaller
changes in test score.
Performance data was collected for 290 researchers in22 research and
development organizations using questionnaireswhich asked people to
rate their own performance relative to othersin similar positions
by placing themselves on a 7 point scale rangingfrom "in top 5%" to
"in the lower 25%". The same questionnaire wasreadministered to 90
of the researchers two years later. Cross—sectional analysesof the
two sets of responses found self—rated performanceto be uncorrelated
with seniority.
Progress made during third grade inmath and in reading by each of
approximately 900 black students was measured usingchanges in the
students' standard scores on Metropolitan Achievement Tests.Controlling
for other factors, the biggest improvement instudents' test scores
was observed for teachers with three tofour years of experience.
Teachers with five or more years of experience werefound to be
no more effective or less effectivethan teachers with three or four
years of experience.
Three measures of performance werecollected for approximately
2,500 design and development engineersat six companies (1)
performance ratings done by management;(2) management evaluations
of the complxity of engineers' assignments;and (3) engineers' own
assessments of what happens to the productivityof those doing
technical work as they age. Rated performance was highestfor those
(continued on next page)
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Subject Group Methodology and Conclusions
and Stud.y
aged 31 to 35 and fell off sharply thereafter. Those 26 to 30
performed the most complex tasks, with older engineers doing much less
complex work. The engineers themselves said peak productivity for those
doing technical work occurred at age 38. However, salaries were
substantially higher for those in each successive age bracket through the
41 to 45 year old group and were level beyond age 45.
Third grade Cross—sectional data from a survey covering 1,061 third—grade students
teachers in a large California school system was used. Individual students'
(Hanushek [1970]. third grade Stanford Achievement test scores were used as a measure
of educational output. Controlling for students' first grade
test scores and other relevant factors, neither second grade
teachers' experience nor third grade teachers' experiencewas found
to have any significant effect on third grade test score.
Male production Data was collected on 113 male production managers in one division of
managers (Tenopyr a rocket engine development and manufacturing concern. The study
[1969]). focused on how well various tests of leadership potential predict
managerial success, but included a correlation analysis of seniority
versus performance. Two measures of performance were used: (1)
immediate supervisors were asked to check descriptive statements about
each manager and integral weights from 0 to 4 were applied in scoring
the checklists; and (2) the company's labor relations staff rated
the manager's handling of employee relations matters on a 7—interval
scale. For the 86 subjects for whom both performance measures were
available, seniority was not found to be significantly correlated
with either rating.
Research Longitudinal data on average number of papers published per year during
scientists each of two successive five year periods was collected for 40 research
(Elduson [1966]). scientists ranging in age from their 30's to their 60's. Subjects'
curriculum vitae were the source of the publication information. Pro-
ductivity was steady for those aged 30 to 39 at the end of the first
five year period, grew slightly for those aged 40 to 49, and fell off
for those aged 50 or greater.
Research Number of patent memoranda, number of patent applications and number
chemists of patents issued were used as measures of productivity. Altogether 962
(Stewart and man—years worth of data for 89 men in one division of a large industrial
Sparks [1966]). scientific research organization were collected. Each of these 962
man years was treated as a separate observation in a cross sectional
analysis. All three paterit'variables were positively correlated with
length of service; however, the positive association between patent
activity and length of service was much weaker beyond 10 years of
service than prior to that cutoff.52
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Supervisors were asked to complete a performance evaluation of each of
their subordinates, rating them on "overall effectiveness," which was
not explicitly defined. A significant negative correlation was found
between these ratings and individual employees' length of service.
The supervisors' ratings were also negatively correlated with salary.
Production records covering an eight week period for approximately
6,000 workers in twelve cities were analyzed. An index of
performance was computed for each worker by dividing his/her
production score by the average production score of all workers
aged 35 to 44 doing similar work in the sallie city. Those with
less than six months service had the lowest average performance
index; beyond six months, length of service seemed to be unimportant.
Five measures of current perfOrmance were collected fora cross—section
of 1,311 scientists and engineers working in 11 research laboratories:
(1) contribution to scientific knowlege, as judged by colleagues; (2)
overall usefulness to laboratory, again as judged by colleagues; (3)pub—
lished papers; (4) patent applications; and (5) unpublishedpapers. All
the performance measures were for the five year period prior to the date of
the study. For those in research laboratories, measured performance typ-
ically was highest among those aged 35—44 as of the time of the study; for
those in development laboratories, the peak occurred among those 45
to 49. Performance among those immediately beyond the peak age group
was sharply lower. A second peak in performance was evident 10 to 15
years beyond the first performance peak.
'ata on physical volume of production per hour worked over an
observation period of 4 to 12 weeks was collected tor approximately
6,000 workers in 5 federal agencies and 21 privatecompanies. An indexof performance was computed for each worker bytaking the
ratio of his/her output to the average output of thoseaged 35 to
44 employed at the same firm and doingcomparable work. Among
workers with 9 months or more experience on thejob, there was
practically no difference in the mean value of the performance index
across age groups, either within occupationalgroups or when an
average was taken across the occupational groups. A large
proportion of those included in the sample were under incentive
payment schemes. However, the results looked very similar for
those under incentive and those under time payment plans53
5





























Performance of approximately 900 technical employees in one firm
was estimated using cross—sectional data on individuals' positions
in the annual order—of—merit rankings of technical employees. These
rankings were done on a department by department basis for salary
administration purposes. The criterion used in ranking was the
workers' "present value to the compnay". This criterion was not
defined more precisely. Among those doing research and development
work, performance was highest for those 30 to 35 and fell off grad-
ually thereafter. Among those doing engineering work, performance
fell off for those aged 32 through 50, then showed a second peak for
those in their 50's.
The dollar volume of sales for clerks in two large department
stores were used to form performance ratings of 1 through 4,
depending on each individuals' quartile postion in the distribution
of dollar sales for his/her department. At one store, mean rated
performance was lower for those with less than 3 years service than
for those in the longer service groups, and weakly but positively
related to service thereafter. At the second store, mean rated
performance was lower for those with less than 6 years service than
for those with more service and again weakly but positively
related to service thereafter.
For approximately 5,100 workers in 15 footwear establishments and
11 furniture establishments, output per worker—hour was measured
using average straight time hourly piecework earnings. The
production index used for comparison purposes was each individual's
average hourly earnings divided by the mean of average hourly earnings
for those of the same sex in the 35 to 44 age group doing the same
job in the same plant. In both industries and for both sexes, the
mean value of the production index was highest for those aged 25 to
34 and fell off beyond that age group.
Piecework earnings data for 933 workers in the footwear industry and
1,284 workers in the clothing industry was studied. The data were
used to create a production index like that used in Bureau of Labor
Statistics (1957). The mean value of this production index was
stable for all age groups through age 54 and approximately 10
percent lower for those agi 55 to 64..54 6
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The goal of this study was to identify the age by which numerous
individuals in various fields had done their best work or achieved
their highest average rate of productivity. In the majority of
occupations, it was found that the individulas' best work had been
done by age 40. However, it should be emphasized that the study
focused on selected outstanding individuals rather than on a
representative sampling of members of any occupation.
Relative speed of work for a cross—section of 701employees of one
railroad was used as a measure of worker efficiency.Holding age
constant, efficiency appeared to peak at about 10 years of service
and fall off thereafter.
Records on productivity of workers at six companies were obtained
and broken down into a comparison of productivity by age groups
for 172 textile weavers, 127 textile spinners and 147 workers in
nonferrous metal manufacturing. The records did not show any
tendency for productivity to vary with age.55
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Noinforiost ion you ubnIt willho Identified with
youor yourcompany without your written
permission. Pleasereturn to:







You should answer this survey only if:(1) you are employed by a private—
sector, for—profit firm whose principal activity is ralthar agriculture nor
construction; (2) you make decisicns concerning the management of human
resources affecting omiOyessotherthan those whom you supervise directly.





S Yourtelephone number: — —__________________________ _______
Aspart of our ongoinghuman resourcesresearch program, we are currently conducting a
comprehensivesudv of Ircloluntarv seoara:ionsat U.S. cc•Tooanies. Ourcol is to generate a suhataatiol 000uot of eroniricalevidenceci companies' decisions rogardins
employmentcutbacks e believesuchinformation should beofgreatvalue andinterest
tomany managers.
This survey is primarily concerned with the factors that influence management decisions
pertaining to emplorment cutbacks. Other components of our research effort include
computeranalysis of data from a number of major U.S. corporations and in—depth
interviews with officials at those same firms.
Completing this questionnaire should take no more than five ninutes of your tine. Your
cooperation will be invaluable toourresearch effort:
If you would like us to send you a personal copy of our sulmuary report, please besure
you have given us your mailing address above and check the appropriate box.
I would like a personal copy ofthesummaryreport.DYes. No.
1. Approximately how many people are employed by your company?
2. What is the principal product or service supplied byyour company?
3.Rowwould you classify the largest group of employees who are affected byyour
decisions concerning the management of human resources?
Hourly. Non—exempt salary. Exempt.
4. Are the majority of the members of the group you checked In question 3 coveredby
either a written company policy pertaining to conditions of employment or by a
collective bargaining agreement?
Yes, by a written company policy.
0Yes,by a collective bargaining agreement.
No(PLEASESKIP TO QUESTION 9).58
5.Does this wr Iten policy r collective bargaining agreement deal with piens?
Yes. Eo (PLEASE SKIP JO QSTION 7).
6.Under thetermsof the policy or agreement, is senIority the most important factor
in awarding promotions?
[]Yes. No.
7. Does this written policy or collective bargaining agreement deal withpermanent
layoffs?
0Yes. No (PLEASE SKIP TO QUESTION 9).
8. Under the terms of the policy or agreement, is seniority the most important
factor in determiningwtte Ispermanently laid offduring any reduction in the workforce?
Yes. LINo.
9. In actual practice, would one of the junior employees in the group you checked Ia
question 3 ever be promoted instead of a mere sentor employee who wanted the job?
Yea,ifthe junior employee was oonsiered a better performer than the
senior employee.
DYes,If the junior employee was considered a significantly better performer
than the senior employee.
0No,never.
10. In the event of a reduction in the workforce, would oneof thesenioremployees inthe grouo you checked in question 3everbe Involuntarily terminated, that is,
laid off permanently against his or herwill, in place of a junior employee?
UYes,if the junior employee was considered a better performer than the
senior employee.
Yes,if thejunior employee was considered a significantly better performer
thanthe senior employee.
0No,never.
11. During the years in which you have been involved in decision making in thehuman
resources area, have permanent layoffs ever been used to reduce the size of the
group you checked in question 3?
0No,never (PLEASE STOP HERE).
DYes,permanent layoffs have been used once or twice.
Yes, permanent layoffs have been used more than twice.
12. What percent of the group you checked in question 3 waspermanentlylaid off
in your most recent reduction of the workforce?
percent.
13.Whatpercent of the group you checked in question 3 was permanently laid off in
the next most recent reduction of your worktorce?
______percent.
Does not apply. We have used permanent layoffs only once.
fThank you
enclosed
for your help. Please return this questionmaire in the
envelope.